The Communist Party of Turkey held its 2013 Conference in Istanbul on
September 14, 2013. The political report, which was discussed and
amended by the party members throughout conference process was finally
accepted by the delegates.
The 2013 Conference focused on the new tasks of the party following the
popular uprising, which has changed all balances in the social and
political sphere in Turkey.
The conference decided to propose, the list of a new Central Committee,
composed of 24 members, to the party congress.
Below you will find the political report entitled
"Revolutionary Tasks in the Light of the People's Resistance and the
Creation of the Socialist Alternative".
TKP 2013 Conference Statement
REVOLUTIONARY TASKS IN THE LIGHT OF PEOPLE’S RESISTANCE and
THE CREATION OF THE SOCIALIST ALTERNATIVE
1. It has become obvious that the Second Republic will not be able
to institutionalize to achieve stability
a) The
historical transformation that was materialized by the requirements of the
capitalist class, the regional plans of the US imperialism and the aspirations
of the reactionism in Turkey failed to secure the order of capital, contrary to
the expectations of the class and political forces that supported this
transformation. The reactionary transformation which can be described as the
dissolution of the First Republic and the establishment of the Second has
rocked the bourgeois dictatorship to its roots making it more vulnerable when
it was attempting to solidify its rule.
b) Founded in
the 1920’s at the peak of the bourgeois revolution, the First Republic has been
restructured in accordance with the interests of the bourgeoisie; cleansed of
the historically valuable progressive constituents intrinsic to its foundation;
undermined by anti-communism and hostility towards labor and finally dissolved
when it became impossible to reshape it in accordance with the latest
orientation of the capitalist class and imperialism.
c) The early
failure of the Second Republic doesn’t indicate a return to the First Republic
but rather threatens the rule of capital as a whole and creates revolutionary
possibilities for the working class. In this perspective, the thesis of socialist
revolution and program has regained relevance.
d) The failure
of the Second Republic is not a temporary one, it cannot be reversed. The
process will either gain a chaotic character with successive upheavals and
sharp turns or the bourgeoisie, with the approval of international capital,
will attempt to put into effect a different model. Another possibility is that the working class
changes the course of the country completely to put an end to the rule of
capital.
e) There are
multiple factors that make the Second Republic’s failure a permanent one. For
imperialism, all of the dynamics that made the Second Republic preferable to
the first one have stalled. Dreams of smooth sailing for the capitalism of Turkey
have been shattered right at the onset. The US realized that it has over-relied
on Turkey while the conflict between the AKP government and other imperialist
countries and regional forces has deepened. The reactionism of Turkey, having
gained a lot of ground after settling accounts with the Republican tradition,
is now paying the price of its initial euphoria of victory and facing the
social potential of enlightenment and patriotism, it is wavering.
f) Despite the
massive slashing of workers’ rights and the establishment of market rule that
completely ignores public interests, the capitalist class still doesn’t feel
safe. The expansion of the economy of Turkey by being mostly dependent on
international political balance has in certain aspects worsened the structural
problem as opposed to alleviating it. The economy of Turkey carries great risks
connected to the potential reduction of foreign investments, over-indebtedness,
deficit increase and the burst of the bubble in construction and service sectors.
Disturbed by the interventions made by the AKP government in the domestic
capitalist balances, the bourgeoisie has less faith in the government.
g) The Neo-Ottomanist policy of
AKP put into practice in a large region starting with Arab countries, has collapsed
in a short time despite the support and approval of US imperialism. The
collapse cannot just be attributed to the failure of the attempt to overthrow the
Baath regime in Syria. It has been very quickly been proven that Neo-Ottomanism
is not only a very dangerous but also a futureless project by Turkey which
lacks economic, political and ideological resources to transform itself into a
regional power and eventually an imperialist country.
h) The fascism of September 12
1980, clearing the way for the religious ideologies to organize on the one hand
and oppressing the left, the carrier of enlightenment experience, on the other,
prepared the foundation which would later be used by the AKP government to
religionize the social and political life. AKP, while relying on this
foundation, got carried away; disregarding the spirit of enlightenment in
Turkey, it assumed that the people would remain unresponsive towards all its
interventions in people’s lifestyles, public spaces. It is now proven that this was a dead wrong
assumption. AKP government which had been faltering in its economic and
international policies has also started struggling in the ideological front as
well.
2. The bourgeoisie of Turkey can not only intervene in the chaotic
region of Middle East where there is never ending violence due to imperialist
intervention and competition, but it has also taken on a load it cannot really
carry
a) The bourgeoisie of Turkey which
has mobilized after the collapse of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia to solidify
its economic and political presence along with other forces in Caucasus and
Balkans has not only discovered its own limits but also become familiar with
the realities of the region. After a few ambitious but failed attempts, via
policies that are politically cautious and economically opportunistic, the
bourgeoisie of Turkey has gained substantial power in both regions, becoming
the main interlocutor for strategically important international projects, thanks
to energy pipelines. Throughout this period, the interests of the bourgeoisie
of Turkey have been safeguarded by the Turkish Armed Forces as well as the low
profiled but effective actions of religious organizations headed by the Gülen
sect.
b) AKP government, using the
religion and with the aid of a closer collaboration with the US imperialism,
has convinced the bourgeoisie of Turkey that the conditions were ripe for more
aggressive regional policies. This way, while competing with other countries in
the Balkans, the interests of the Russia were confronted in Caucasus. The
Moscow government which considers ex-Soviet Union Republics its sphere of
influence has acted in order to limit the presence of Turkey to only economic activities;
increased the pressure on the countries in the region and shut down some of the
schools that had been opened by Gülen sect.
c) In Arab countries, the critical
region for Neo-Ottomanist expansion, AKP government has pursued openly hostile
methods and at times has undertaken initiatives that would even go beyond the
US plans. Neo-Ottomanism has moved with motives, some openly expressed by AKP
officials and every single one being a reason for tension or even conflict.
- Neo-Ottomanism has been seen as
key to convince the cautious bourgeoisie of Turkey for balder policies in
pursuit of new areas of investment and markets.
- Neo-Ottomanism has been modeled
as a foreign policy practice to supply the energy that would be needed to
stabilize and consolidate the Second Republic.
- Neo-Ottomanism has been designed
as a tool to further the collaboration with US imperialism and to become the
main contractor of Washington in the region.
- Neo-Ottomanism has been
preferred as the path to establish and strengthen the Sunni axis which is the
ideological driver of AKP reactionism.
- Neo-Ottomanism has been seen as
a channel that can be used to further the political, military and financial
relations with the reactionary Arab governments.
- Neo-Ottomanism has been
designated as the strategy to not only keep the Kurdish problem under control
but also turn it into an opportunity.
- Neo-Ottomanism has been planned
as a project to facilitate the political and economic integration of oil rich regions of Iraqi Kurdistan and
Syria and the transformation of Turkey into a looser, decentralized structure
of governance.
- Neo-Ottomanism has been accepted
as an opportunity to eliminate Iran and Egypt, the competitors of the
capitalism of Turkey in the Islamic word and to strengthen Turkey’s hand
against Israel, US’s vital partner in the region.
d) Neo-Ottomanism has gone through
four phases.
The first phase is the phase of
preparation and enquiry. AKP negotiated with the US government before coming to
power in an attempt to convince them of new roles AKP would be willing to play.
While AKP couldn’t convince Washington to collaborate with various Islamist
forces in the region (since at that time the US government needed a different
role to be played by the Islamists in order to create the new US enemy), it still
got the US support it needed for getting to power. Throughout this period, also
aided by the Gülen sect, AKP increased its political, cultural and economic
influence in the Islamic world.
In the second phase of
Neo-Ottomanism epitomized in the person of Erdoğan, the reactionary leadership
of Turkey carried out systematic work to deceive the peoples of Middle East by
creating the illusion of an anti-imperialist and anti-Zionist stance and
succeeded in this deception. The governments of Syria and Iran which were
targets of US aggression, the political forces in Palestine and most
importantly Arap peoples believed that AKP was their friend. The tension
between Turkey and Israel which was in large part a big show was used to
further the deception and AKP managed to wash away the disreputable image of
Turkey, a NATO member in the Arab world.
The third phase started when Obama
became the US president. Unable to send more troops to the region, the US was
convinced by AKP for collaboration with the Sunni political actors in the
region. There is a clear connection between the Neo-Ottomanist policies and the
transformation of the Tunisian and Egyptian uprising into to the process called
“Arab Spring”. The political parties that came to power in both countries were
close allies of AKP and with the successful destruction of Libya; it was now
Syria’s turn, a country important for both Erdoğan and Obama.
It is probable that the fourth
phase of Neo-Ottomanism is also the last one. The failure of the attempts to
overthrow the Syrian government, the resistance of the people of Syria against
the terrorist groups, the public reaction in Turkey against the AKP policies
against Syria, the Muslim Brotherhood regime in Egypt not being able to stay in
power due to a large popular movement against it, all these developments have
disrupted all the plans. Russia has made it clear that it will protect its own
interests in the region and the US government has given signals that it is not
happy with the foreign policy practice of Ankara; some of the US contractors
over whom Turkey was attempting to establish leadership have shown that they were
not as willing to accept AKP leadership as AKP had assumed.
e) The failure of the Neo-Ottoman
project has also pushed AKP’s last hopeful move about the Kurdish problem into
a state of uncertainty. The “Peace Process” in fact contained plans to
collaborate with the Kurdish groups in Syria in order to overthrow the Baath
regime. But the fact that the bigger powers have kept the solution “with Assad”
on the negotiating table has rendered this planned collaboration useless.
f) The political positions held by
the Kurdish in Iraq for a long time and the new Kurdish positions gained by
actual conflict in Syria directly impact Iran and Turkey, home to the largest
and most political Kurdish population. Even though the Kurdish problem has
passed through different historical phases and has different class, ideological
and political foundations, it has been acquiring a regional characteristic. When
taking a position on a problem that concerns all the peoples of the region, it
is necessary to take into account the regional and international balances. On
that note, the interests of overt or covert struggle between the international
capital, imperialism and reactionary forces on the one hand and the
revolutionary forces on the other plays a determinant role.
g) The alerting of both domestic
and international public by the Communist Party of Turkey on the tendencies of
the government in Turkey after having followed the Neo-Ottoman project closely
from the start, the correct analysis of the Arab Spring by the Party are both
of historical value. In the upcoming period, it will be necessary to increase
the collaboration and information sharing among communist and progressive
forces and strengthen the political and theoretical capabilities in the region.
3. Capitalism, not even able to manufacture fake hopes is waiting
for its death
a) Capitalism is not able to
overcome the economic crisis it is in. It is facing historical and structural
problems. The current crisis is not the product of financial policies but
ultimately a reflection of the conflict between over-production, the decrease
in the rate of profit, the social structure of production and the concentration
of the means of production in the hands of monopolies.
b) It is not surprising that the
crisis was initially felt in the weaker economies in EU’s grip. Forced to
deploy destructive economic policies during their integration into the union,
Greece and Portugal plunged into debt, lost their main industrial production;
they were dealt a blow in the agricultural sector and were left vulnerable from
an economic perspective facing Germany and France at the center of the union.
While a similar process can also be described for ex-socialist countries
accepted into the union, the economic destruction in all these countries cannot
simply be explained by membership in the European Union. The crisis not only
deeply impacts Spain and Italy, two countries watched over by the union, but
even the strong imperialist countries. There is no economic dynamism in sight
in the whole continent to overcome the crisis and recession.
c) Measures put into effect by USA,
the hegemonic imperialist power, to alleviate the crisis actually deepen the
problems of US domestic as well as the capitalist world economy. The US economy
is sustained by its borrowing power and subsequently its ability to keep the
money markets under control. Maintaining its leadership in the imperialist
world via political and military domination rather than economic power, the US
cannot do without continuing to remain the dominant imperialist power.
d) Countries with high growth
rates like China, Brazil, India and the Russian Federation which is grouped
among the aforementioned countries due to political reasons, can neither become
an economic alternative nor shield themselves from the dynamics of the capitalist
crisis for long. Having benefited from having stayed behind economically, the
presence of big domestic markets coupled with a lot of resources and labor
power; due to the ongoing crisis, these countries have started to lose their
competitive power which is mostly based on higher rates of labor exploitation.
In conditions of crisis, the market dependency on developed capitalist
countries shrinks the value of their competitive power based on higher rates of
exploitation.
e) The crisis increases the probability
of wars as it triggers more imperialist competition. It is possible that the
regional and civil wars that have so far been limited to military interventions
go through a qualitative transformation. It is not possible to predict how the conflicts between Russia,
People’s Republic of China, Japan and US in the Pacific; US, Russia and Germany
in the Middle East; US, People’s Republic of China, France and Germany in
Africa will play out. It is also not possible to foresee clearly the future blocks
to be formed among these powers.
f) As a whole, capitalism has
nothing to offer to humanity other than poverty, difficult working conditions,
unemployment, reactionism and wars. More importantly, capitalism cannot even
present humanity with new fake sets of hopes and ideals. It is the first time
in its history that capitalism faces such a lack of perspective. This means
that a heavy political and ideological crisis is also under way.
g) The lack of a future for
capitalism creates a great opportunity for the international communist
movement. The emergent suitable
conjuncture needs to be seized upon in order to strengthen the revolutionary
spirit in the movement, to pacify liberal tendencies and to solidify the
ideological unity of the movement.
4. As the most important and sweeping social movement in our
history, June Resistance has unleashed a political energy that goes well beyond
the anti-AKP and Erdoğan stance
a) With its scale, shape and
political slogans, the June Resistance is a popular uprising. This uprising, as
opposed to being the product of a revolutionary surge, is a retort to the
unlawfulness, tyranny and excessiveness of the government.
b) June Resistance, even though it
started as a rebellion against police oppression following an environmentalist
action, has a dominant ideological and political frame that is unusual for a
movement of this scale. The ideology of enlightenment and freedoms has found
its political expression in an absolute anti-AKP position.
c) June Resistance has a leftist
orientation. The ideology of enlightenment and freedoms has in many instances
been blended with the ideas of solidarity and equality as well as patriotism.
There is no insurmountable obstacle between the socialist ideology and the
masses of people who have participated in the resistance.
d) June Resistance is a
spontaneous movement. No spontaneous movement can fully rule out an organized
and conscious participation in it. The fact that organized political forces
were an organic part of June Resistance right from the start and that Taksim
Solidarity emerged as a coordination center does not take away from the
spontaneous character of the movement.
e) Despite the heavy participation
of the working class in the movement, June resistance is not a class movement.
Ideas of solidarity and equality have not been expressed on the axis of the
labor-capital conflict but more on a moral and ethical basis. While the
reflection of the movement in the work places and process of production was
limited, workers have participated in the resistance after work and in their
neighborhoods. June Resistance is not a popular movement dominated by the
middle class either. While the priorities of the resistance were different
based on the actual location of actions, it is also clear that workers from all
sectors, unemployed, retirees, housewives, small business owners and students
have all participated in the resistance.
f) June Resistance is a social
event that has been attended heavily by women. Having tried to box the women
into limited roles in social life, the government has been dealt a significant
political blow. Women have gained tremendous positions by defending their
demands for freedom by actively fighting against the government and reactionism.
It would have been impossible to gain these positions by forms of organizing that
constraint them within their women identity.
g) The shallowness of the argument
that the youth is insensitive to the problems of the country has once again been
exposed by the June resistance. Even though the popular movement cannot simply
be reduced to the youth, it is also a fact that working class and student youth
have massively participated in the resistance. The government has realized what
a grave mistake it has made by basing its plans on an “apolitical youth”.
h) June Resistance has caught the
opposition parties in the Parliament, the unions and Alevi organizations off
guard. CHP, not being able to formulize a political objective even though being
the main opposition party, was pushed aside. BDP and the Kurdish movement in
general had the tendency to see the resistance as a potential threat to its own
agenda. The Unions and Alevi organizations were not able to unite and feed off
the popular dynamics, they were rendered ineffective.
i) June Resistance has a dealt a
major blow to the elements in the left that were hesitant in breaking away from
liberalism. Those who saw decentralization and localization as an alternative
to the working class socialism have been caught completely off-guard. It has
also been seen once again that practices of revolutionary democratic activism
cannot become a partner in the collective mind and legitimacy of a real popular
movement.
j) June Resistance is full of
lessons to be learned that are related to the political and ideological
tendencies of the Kurdish politics. Continuing and conflicting statements made by
the representatives of the Kurdish politics reveal the level of discomfort they
feel about the June Resistance. It is not only the anti-AKP position of the
movement that is at the source of this discomfort. Kurdish politics cannot
tolerate any social movement that is not under its control and fully aligned
with its own agenda.
k) At this stage, June Resistance
cannot be boxed into a set of quests and conflicts within the system. While the
fact that an alternative for a revolutionary rule has not yet matured makes the
movement vulnerable to liberalism and social democracy, one should not expect a
radical change in the structure of the movement that puts socialism at an
advantageous position against the bourgeois politics and ideology. In this
context, in addition to the totality and unity of the popular movement, taking
the path towards real liberation is equally important. In the following period,
we will fight against any attempts to divert the movement from this path.
l) Despite the important functions
of the forums in the last period when both the politics within the system and
the resistance have lost pace, the energy of the June Resistance points to a
horizon beyond the forums. There is a great field completely open for socialist
organizing and action.
m) June Resistance has not been
beaten, it has not gone anywhere. It is obvious that in the forthcoming period,
the resistance will continue to exist albeit in different forms. It is also
possible that the resistance transform into a revolutionary uprising.
5. TKP has contributed a lot to the resistance, has also learnt a
lot from it and has refreshed its political and ideological confidence. The
Party will do its best to respond to the popular quest and to accomplish its
revolutionary tasks
a) From a political and
ideological perspective, the Communist Party of Turkey was not caught
unprepared when the June Resistance started. Having emphasized for a long time
that Turkey will not fit in the straitjacket of AKP, the Party also indicated
in the first half of the year that the anger of the people were approaching an
explosive level. TKP had also pointed to the spirit of enlightenment and
freedom in that accumulating anger. The Party also grasped very well the
importance of youth, the dimensions of the enlightenment and patriotic
potential and the meaning behind the alliances in Syria and it has taken
initiatives in these areas.
b) The Communist Party of Turkey
cannot underestimate the tension between settling the accounts with the current
government and creating a real, concrete socialist option. The problem is not
about the people gravitating towards an urgent solution for getting rid of the AKP
government and preferring this solution over another political alternative that
will take longer to build. The connection between patriotism, the ideology of
enlightenment and a socialist program needs to be rebuilt. Both ideologies have
been let loose and free to the extent that they have gone beyond the limits of
the First Republic riding the popular movement. Even if the higher level
ideology that can attract both is socialism, it should not be assumed that the
enlightenment and patriotic tendencies in the society will automatically be
connected to the struggle for socialism. The Party needs to reevaluate and
restructure both these tendencies without taking into account any of the
existing left arguments.
c) The Communist Party of Turkey
cannot take a long time to accomplish the mission of adding the working class
character to the widespread popular movement. The political and ideological
move to organize the class and make it a dominant factor in the popular movement
cannot succeed without openly settling the account with organizations and
mentality that have crippled the laboring masses. The Party has to shorten the
path the workers take to organized politics. Given the current conditions,
instead of waiting for the center of the popular movement to shift into the
work place and waiting for the working class to create its own models of
organization, it is necessary to strengthen the working class at the points
most appropriate to the structure of the current popular movement. For the
moment, it is not possible to consider the unions and trade organizations as a
surface of contact for the politicization of the working class. The people,
including the working class have already gone beyond these organizations in
terms of horizon as well as scale. The Party will consider the unions and trade
organizations important and help strengthen them to the extent that they
provide a real opportunity for struggle but it will not place them as the focal
point of its class organizing.
d) Instead of seeing the change in
the structure of the working class as something negative, the Communist Party
of Turkey will in fact focus on the new opportunities revealed by the June
Resistance. Instead of delegating to the other platforms the responsibility to
develop the ideological, political, organizational and cultural tools that will
place an educated, young and dynamic working class sum in the center of the
popular movement, the Party should restructure all its work accordingly.
e) The Communist Party of Turkey
needs to continue its determination to reach bigger scales in its organizing
among the student youth. While there is a bigger possibility to create a new
students movement today, it is important to stay away from imitating the past and
simply repeating it. The revolutionary heritage of the 60s can be put to good
use only by accomplishing the objectives of today. The student youth is no more
a privileged group stuck in a few large cities but a large mass waiting to join
the working class of Turkey as well as the army of unemployed. The Party will
maintain the separation and the autonomy of the student organizing but it will
strengthen it with its political and ideological agenda. The Party will also
pay more attention to the transitivity between the student youth, the working
class youth and the neighborhood dynamics.
f) The Communist Party will
maintain an open, simple and principled approach towards the Kurdish problem
which gets more and more complicated every passing day. The Party is the first
address for the Kurdish workers in Turkey. United struggle and liberation is a
key point in the program of the Party. The meaning of this is that there is an
historical accord between the demands of equality and freedom by Kurds as a
nation and the liberation of the working class of Turkey. The Party will
continue to base its decisions on this accord. The guide of the Party when it
comes to the developments at the regional scale on the Kurdish problem and the
tendencies of the Kurdish national movement is nothing but the interests of the
revolutionary front in Turkey and in the region. These interests are not
abstract; they crystallize within the struggle against imperialism, the capital
and reactionism. The Party determines its friends and enemies in the light of
these interests.
g) The Communist Party of Turkey
will continue to stay away from constricting and discriminating attitudes
towards the June Resistance. The Party
will also continue its non-competing and non-sectarian approach towards the
others in the left. TKP will do its best for all necessary collaboration as dictated
by the interests of the struggle. However, TKP will not be spending time in
pursuits of alliances in the upcoming period. The Party will not waste time on
agendas that can push back its ideological and political responsibilities,
stealing energy from the struggle. This attitude is valid for the upcoming local
elections as well. The Party will develop constructive policies to enable the
emergence of mayor candidates who can respond to the popular patriotic and
enlightenment tendencies, who will defend the social interests instead of the
interests of the market and will support these candidates but the Party will
not do all this with the expectation of a complete alliance. This objective
related to the local elections will be combined with and adapted to the work to
achieve the representation of communist politics in the local governance.
h) The Communist Party of Turkey
takes very seriously the popular demand “Government, resign!” and it is in
complete accord with this demand. The realization of this demand cannot wait
for the strengthening of the socialist alternative. On the contrary, whether
the socialist alternative will strengthen or not will be determined by the
impact of the communists in satisfying the aforementioned demand.
i) The predictions on the
potential problems that the Party would be faced with in case of a social
mobilization have also unfortunately been proven right to a large extent. There
was not enough time to make the Party politics more effective and to change the
organizational structure and operations to be more suitable for the
revolutionary tasks at hand. Nevertheless, the popular movement has proven to
be more efficient than all administrative interventions, facilitating the
emergence of a collective willpower necessary for this restructuring.
j) By the lessons taken from the
June Resistance, the Communist Party of Turkey will be able attain the
political focus and organizational simplicity that it has been debating for a
while. The people have a determination of steel to settle the accounts with the
government. TKP has the task of strengthening this determination as well as
increasing the level of organization within this determination. The people are
in pursuit of a political alternative different from the current one. This
pursuit is open to the idea of left and socialism. TKP has the task of making
sure that a socialist alternative emerges out of this pursuit. The Party will
focus on these two intertwined tasks. The Party organization will be simplified
accordingly to suit these tasks at hand.
k) With its strong belief in a
bright future, the Communist Party of Turkey calls all workers, intellectuals,
students of Turkey to join its ranks in order to strengthen the socialist
alternative and establish the socialist rule.